A methodology that facilitates the design of fault-tolerant computing systems is presented. It is based on the notion of a fail-stop processor. Such a processor automatically halts in response to any internal failure and does so before the effects of that failure become visible. The problem of implementing processors that, with high probability, behave like fail-stop processors is addressed. Axiomatic program verification techniques are described for use in developing provably correct programs for fail-stop processors. The design of a process control system illustrates the use of our methodology.
INTRODUCTION
Programming a computer system that is subject to failures is a difficult task. A malfunctioning processor might perform arbitrary and spontaneous state transformations instead of the transformations specified by the programs it executes. Thus even a correct program cannot be counted on to implement a desired inputoutput relation when executed on a malfunctioning processor. On the other hand, it is impossible to build a computer system that always operates correctly in spite Permission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, the ACM copyright notice and the title of the publication and its date appear, and notice is given that copying is by permission of the Association for Computing Machinery. To copy otherwise, or to republish, requires a fee and/or specific permission. of failures in its components by using (only) a finite amount of hardware) Thus the goal of implementing completely fault-tolerant computing systems is unattainable. Fortunately, most applications do not require complete fault-tolerance. Rather, it is sufficient that a system work correctly provided that no more than some predefined number of failures occur within some time interval, or that certain types of failures do not occur. This more modest goal is attainable.
In this paper we present an approach to designing fault-tolerant computing systems based on the notion of a fail-stopprocessor, a processor with well-defined failure-mode operating characteristics. Briefly, our approach is as follows. First, software is designed assuming the existence of a computing system composed of one or more fail-stop processors; the number of processors required is dictated by response-time constraints that must be satisfied by the system. Then, a computing system is designed that implements the requisite fail-stop processors.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of a fail-stop processor and considers how such processors can be approximated using presentday hardware. Section 3 discusses extensions to axiomatic verification techniques for facilitating the development of provably correct programs for fail-stop processors. Satisfying response time constraints in the presence of failures is the subject of Section 4. Section 5 discusses the application of our approach to a nontrivial problem: the design of a fault-tolerant process-control system. Section 6 contrasts our work with other approaches to designing fault-tolerant systems, and Section 7 presents some conclusions.
FAIL-STOP PROCESSORS

Definition
A processor is characterized by its instruction set. Each instruction causes a welldefined transformation on the internal state of the processor and/or the connected storage and peripheral devices. Thus the effects of executing each instruction can be described by a precise semantic definition, be it a temporalaxiomatization of the instruction set [18] or a "Principles of Operation" manual. A failure occurs when the behavior of the processor is not consistent with this semantic definition.
A fail-stop processor is distinguished by its extremely simple failure-mode operating characteristics. First, the internal state of a fail-stop processor and some predefined portion of the connected storage are assumed to be volatile; the contents of volatile storage are irretrievably lost whenever a failure occurs. The remaining storage is defined to be stable; it is unaffected by any kind of failure.
Secondly, in contrast to a real processor, a fail-stop processor never performs an erroneous state transformation due to a failure. Instead, the processor simply halts. Thus, the only visible effects of a failure in a fail-stop processor are FSI: It stops executing. FS2: The internal state and contents of the volatile storage connected to it are lost.
Implementation
While the notion of a fail-stop processor is a useful abstraction, it is impossible to implement using a finite amount of hardware. With only a finite amount of hardware, a sufficient number of failures could disable all the error detection mechanisms and thus allow arbitrary behavior. It is, however, possible to construct computing systems that, with high probability, approximate the behavior of a fail-stop processor.
One approach is to construct a system that behaves as specified, unless too many failures occur within some specified time interval, after which no assumptions about its behavior can be made. A k-fail-stop processor is a computing system that behaves like a fail-stop processor unless k + 1 or more failures occur in its components. One implementation of a k-fail-stop processor is described below; another appears in [23] .
A k-fail-stop processor can be implemented by exploiting any solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem [13] (or the Interactive Consistency Problem [17] ). Such a protocol allows a collection of processors to agree on a value sent by a potentially faulty transmitter ("Commanding General"), so that (1) each nonfaulty processor agrees on the value sent by the transmitter, and (2) if the transmitter is nonfaulty, each nonfaulty processor receives the value sent by the transmitter.
A number of real processors and volatile memory units are interconnected by a communications network to form a single k-fail-stop processor and its attendant stable storage. Each memory unit Mi is read by all processors but written to by only one, Pi. Failures are detected by having each processor run the same program and comparing results. Thus a copy of each variable is stored in each memory unit. During execution, whenever the value of a variable from stable storage is required, the value of that variable is read from each memory unit and a solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem is employed to distribute the vector of values read to every processor. If all of the values are not identical, then a failure has occured and it is signaled. (Nonfaulty processors will halt when the failure is signaled.) A total of 2k + 1 processors are required in order for up to k failures to be tolerated.
Since processors execute asynchronously, execution of the replicated programs must be synchronized to compare results. This can be accomplished, assuming processor clocks run at roughly the same rate, by associating a logical clock [11] with each program. This logical clock is incremented whenever a variable that is supposed to be stored in the stable storage of the k-fail-stop processor is read or written. To synchronize, a processor constructs a vector of the values of each of these clocks, again using a solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem, and marks time until all components in the vector have the same value or a "timeout" period has elapsed. In the latter case, a failure has occurred and it is signaled.
A collection of k-fail-stop processors are interconnected to implement a system in which real-time response constraints can be met despite failures. In that case, it must be possible for one k-fail-stop processor to detect that another has stopped and then to read the contents of that k-fail-stop processor's stable storage so that the computation in progress at the time of the failure can be continued. This is accomplished as follows. Each k-fail-stop processor is connected to a communications network that allows it to read the contents of the memory units that make up the other k-fail-stop processors. A special location, failedi, in each memory unit Mi, is reserved to record whether processor Pi thinks that the fail-stop processor it is a part of has halted due to a failure. A k-fail-stop processor fsp determines that another, fsp' has halted by computing the vector of values failedi for each memory unit in fsp', using a solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem. If any of the components has value true, then fsp' is deemed halted. Should fsp require the values of the variables in the stable storage of fsp', they can be reconstructed as follows. Each processor in fsp reads a different one of the memory units that make up fsp'. Then, using a solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem, these values are exchanged. The majority value is taken to be the value of the variable. Since at most k of the values read from fsp' are wrong, at least 2k + i different memory units are required to implement stable storage.
While the feasibility of implementing fail-stop processors is established by this argument, the practicality is not. However, recent work in the implementation of highly reliable processors gives reason to believe that it is indeed practical to implement fail-stop processor approximations. Both FTMP [10] and SIFT [26] could be configured to behave like a collection of fail-stop processor approximations; both employ replicated processor and memory units. Redundancy can also be introduced at lower levels in a variety of ways [1, 25] . The level at which redundancy is applied is an important issue and is treated in [2] .
PROGRAMMING A FAIL-STOP PROCESSOR
Recovery Protocols
A program executing on a fail-stop processor is halted when a failure occurs.
Execution may then be restarted on a correctly functioning fail-stop processor.
(This may be the original processor if the cause of the failure has been repaired, or it may be another fail-stop processor.) When a program is restarted, the internal processor state and the contents of volatile storage are unavailable. Thus, some routine is needed that can complete the state transformation that was in progress at the time of the failure and restore storage to a well-defined state.
Such a routine is called a recovery protocol.
Clearly, a recovery protocol (1) must execute correctly when started in any intermediate state that could be visible after a failure and (2) can only use information that is in stable storage. In addition, because the code for a recovery protocol must be available after a failure, it must be kept in stable storage.
We associate a recovery protocol R with a sequence of statements A called the action statement to form a fault-tolerant action FTA as follows:
FTA: action A recovery
R end
Execution of FTA consists of establishing R as the recovery protocol to be in effect when A is executed and then executing A. A program running on a fail-stop processor must at all times have a recovery protocol in effect. This will be the case if the program itself is a single faulttolerant action. Alternatively, a program can be structured as a sequence of faulttolerant actions, assuming that establishment of a recovery protocol can be done in such a way that at all times either the old recovery protocol or the new one is in effect. Such an assumption seems quite reasonable.
Axioms for Fault-Tolerant Actions
Following the Floyd-Hoare axiomatic approach [8] , an assertion is a Booleanvalued expression involving program and logical variables. The syntactic object,
(P) S(Q}
where P and Q are assertions and S is a programming language statement, is called a triple. The triple ( P } S ( Q } is a theorem if there exists a proof of it in a specified formal deductive system, usually called a programming logic. A programming logic consists of a set of axioms and rules of inference that relate assertions, programming language statements, and triples. Of particular interest are those logics that are sound with respect to execution of programming language statements on the program state--that is, deductive systems that are consistent with the operation of a "real" machine. Then, the notation { P } S ( Q } is usually taken to mean:
If execution of S begins in a state in which P is true, and terminates, then Q will be true in the resulting state.
Numerous programming languages have been defined using such logics; a PAS-CAL-like language [9] extended with guarded commands [4] is used in this paper.
It is often more convenient to write a proof outline than a formal proof. A proof outline is a sequence of programming language statements interleaved with assertions. Each statement S in a proof outline is preceded directly by one assertion, called its precondition and denoted pre (S), and is directly followed by an assertion, called its postcondition and denoted post(S). A proof outline is an abbreviation for a proof if POI: for every statement S, the triple {pre(S)} S (post(S)} is a theorem in the programming logic, and P02: whenever (P} and (Q} are adjacent in the proof outline, Q is provable from P.
Let FTA be a fault-tolerant action formed from action statement A and recovery protocol R. We wish to develop an inference rule that will allow derivation of {P} FTA (Q} as a theorem, while preserving the soundness of our programming logic with respect to execution on a fail-stop processor.
First, assume FI: {P'} A (Q'} and {P"} R (Q"} have been proved. Then, for execution of A to establish Q, we will need F2: P ~ P' and Q' ~ Q.
Similarly, for the recovery protocol R to establish Q, the following (at least) must hold:
Recall that R is invoked only following a failure. By definition, the contents of volatile storage are undefined at that time. Therefore, any program variables needed for execution of R must be in stable storage. 3 Thus, we require F4: All program variables named in P" must be in stable storage.
We must also ensure that whenever the recovery protocol receives control, stable storage is in a state that satisfies P". This will be facilitated by constructing a replete proof outline, a proof outline that contains assertions describing only those states that could be visible after a failure. Then, we will require that the precondition of the recovery protocol be satisfied in those states.
A replete proof outline is a proof outline in which certain assertions have been deleted so that RPOI: No assertion appears between adjacent fault-tolerant actions. RPO2: Every triple (P} S (Q} in the replete proof outline satisfies either (a) S is a sequence of fault-tolerant actions, or (b) ( P k/Q } is invariant over execution of S.
RPO1 and RPO2(a) follow because the program state that exists between the execution of two fault-tolerant actions FTA1 and FTA2 is never visible to the recovery protocol for the enclosing fault-tolerant action--either the recovery protocol for FTA1 or the recovery protocol for FTA2 will receive control. RPO2(b) follows because if P V Q remains true while S is being executed, then either P or Q will be true of the state visible to the recovery protocol should a failure occur and both {P} and {Q} already appear as assertions in the replete proof outline. is also a replete proof outline. This is because either the precondition or the postcondition of "x := 6" is true of every state that occurs during execution of the assignment. Even if assignment is not implemented by execution of a single instruction,
is a replete proof outline, because the assertion {val = 3} is not destroyed by assignment to x; it is true before, during, and after execution of "x := val". Therefore, in addition to F1-F4, correct operation of a recovery protocol requires F5: Given a fault-tolerant action with action statement A and recovery protocol R satisfying F1, let al, a2, ..., an be the assertions that appear in a replete proof outline of {P'} A {Q'}, and rl, r2 ..... rm be the assertions that appear in a replete proof outline of (P"} R {Q"}. Then: (a) (Vi: 1 <_ i <--n: ai ~ P") (b) (Vi: 1 __ i -< m: rl ~ P")
Lastly, it must be guaranteed that failures at processors other than the one executing FTA do not interfere with (i.e., invalidate) assertions in the proof outline of FTA. Suppose an assertion in FTA names variables stored in the volatile storage of another processor? Then, should that processor fail, such an assertion would no longer be true since the contents of volatile storage would have been lost. Hence, we require that F6: Variables stored in volatile storage may not be named in assertions appearing in programs executing on other processors.
Given a fault-tolerant action, a restartable action that implements the same state transformation can always be constructed from the recovery protocol alone. (The proof of this follows from F3 and F5.) Thus, in theory, the action statement is unnecessary. In practice, the additional flexibility that results from having an action statement different from the recovery protocol is quite helpful. Presumably, failures are infrequent enough so that a recovery protocol can do a considerable amount of extra work in order to minimize the amount of (expensive) stable storage used. Use of such algorithms for normal processing would be unacceptable.
Fault-Tolerant Programs--A Simple Example
In addition to allowing axiomatic verification of programs written in terms of fault-tolerant actions, F1-F6 permit a programmer to develop a fault-tolerant program and its proof hand-in-hand, with the proof leading the way, as advocated in [4] and [6] . F4 allows those variables that must be stored in stable storage to be identified in a mechanical way from the proof; construction of a replete proof outline provides a mechanical way to determine the intermediate states that could be visible following a failure. To illustrate the use of rules F1-F6 as an aid in developing a recovery protocol, we consider the following (artificial) problem. Things become more complicated when the possibility of failure is considered. In particular, S 1 could not be the action statement of a restartable action because F5 is violated (assuming G is not the identity function): both Pla ~ P and Plb ~ P are false. In order to construct a restartable action, we must find a way to make progress--compute G (X) and G (Y)--without destroying the initial values of x and y until both values have been updated. One way to do this is to modify S1 so that the new values are computed and stored in some temporary variables, giving the following restartable action: This is a replete proof outline, and provided xnew and ynew are stored in stable storage. F1-F6 are satisfied. So
U2: action, recovery (Q": xnew = G(X) A ynew = G(Y))
U2a: x := xnew; {x = xnew = G(X) A ynew = G(Y))
U2b: y := ynew; (x = xnew = G(X) A y = ynew
is a restartable action. Since Q' ~ Q", the desired program is U1; U2
TERMINATION AND RESPONSE TIME
Most statements in our programming notation are guaranteed to terminate, once started. However, loops and fault-tolerant actions are not. Techniques based on the use of variant functions or well-founded sets can be used for proving that a loop will terminate [4] . Unfortunately, without knowledge about the frequency of failures and statement execution times, termination of a program written in terms of fault-tolerant actions cannot be proved. This is because if failures occur with sufficiently high frequency, then there is no guarantee that the component faulttolerant actions will terminate; neither the action statement nor the recovery protocol of a fault-tolerant action can be guaranteed to run without interruption, and so the recovery protocol could continually restart. Moreover, such liveness properties [16] cannot even be expressed in a Hoarestyle programming logic, like the one above. Thus, we must resort to informal means to argue that a program will terminate in a timely manner. Presumably, at some point in the future it will be possible to formalize such arguments. Harter and Bernstein [7] describe extensions to temporal logic [16] that allow construction of a proof that a program will meet some specific response-time goals. That work would have to be extended to deal with stochastically defined events for use in this context.
For a given execution of a program S on a fault-free processor, let t(s) be the maximum length of time that elapses once execution of statement s is begun until execution of the next fault-tolerant action in S is started. Define
Tmax = max t(s). sES
For an execution of S to terminate at all, it is sufficient that there be (enough) intervals of length Vmax during which there are no failures. Then, no fault-tolerant action will be forever restarted as a result of the (high) frequency of failures.
Of course, this gives no bound on how much time will elapse before S completes. Rather, we have argued that S is guaranteed to terminate if the elapsed time between successive failures is long enough, often enough. This should not be surprising. However, it does provide some insight into how to structure a program in terms of fault-tolerant actions if frequent failures are expected: one should endeavor to minimize Tmax. This can be achieved by making entry into a faulttolerant action a frequent event, either by nesting fault-tolerant actions, or by composing them in sequence.
Given a collection of fail-stop processors, it is possible to configure a system that not only implements a given relation between input and output, but performs this state transformation in a timely manner despite the occurrence of failures. After the failure of a fail-stop processor fsp, a reconfiguration rule is used to assign programs that were running on fsp to working fail-stop processors. The recovery protocol in effect at the time of the failure facilitates restart of the program. Thus, processor failures are transparent except for possibly increased execution times.
As a result of a failure, execution delays from the following sources are incurred:
(1) Some time tdetect will elapse after the fail-stop processor halts until that fact is detected and reconfiguration is begun. (2) Reconfiguration causes execution delays, as well. First, trecon is required to determine an appropriate assignment of programs to the remaining fail-stop processors. Then, tmove might be required to move the program code and contents of its stable storage. (3) In the worst case, the effects of the last TA seconds execution by action statement A before the first failure will be lost. (4) TR seconds worth of execution by repeated attempts to perform recovery protocol R as a result of each subsequent failure will also be lost.
Both TA and TR are defined for the specific execution that was interrupted.
This suggests the following strategy for constructing fault-tolerant systems that will continue to behave correctly in spite of up to k failures, for k > 0. A program is developed (1) that implements the desired state transformations when run on fail-stop processors, (2) that satisfies its real-time response constraints provided no failures occur, and (3) in which no process must respond to an event in less than TF seconds, where
Supppose R fail-stop processors are required to ensure that (1)-{3} hold. Then, a computing system with R + k fail-stop processors will be able to tolerate up to k fail-stop processor failures and meet its response-time goals. The obvious reconfiguration nile must be used.
Note that if stable storage that can be shared by the fail-stop processors is available, then tmove can be made 0. Also, by precomputing various configurations, t~ .... can be made negligible. This, however, requires a sufficient amount of stable storage to store all possible configurations. Lastly, TR can be made 0 by using only restartable actions; however, this uniformly degrades execution speed, even if no failures occur.
FAULT-TOLERANT PROCESS-CONTROL SOFTWARE
We now turn to a more substantial illustration of the application of our methodology: development of a fault-tolerant process control program. First, a correct program for a fault-free computing system is developed. The program is then extended to run correctly on a system of fail-stop processors. While a fair amount of detail is presented, these details are necessary to derive and establish the correctness of the program.
Given are sensors to determine the state of the environment and actuators to exert control over the environment. Correct operation of a process-control system requires that PC: The values written to the actuators are related to the values read from the sensors according to a given application-specific function.
It is likely that correct operation also involves a liveness property, like "sensors are read and actuators are updated often enough." We will make no attempt to argue that our program satisfies such real-time response constraints, although informal arguments like those developed in Section 4 could be used if timing data were available.
Assuming No Failures
Our process-control system will be structured as a collection of cyclic processes that execute concurrently. Each process pi is responsible for controlling some set of actuators acti. To do so, it reads from some sensors and maintains statei--a vector of state variables that reflects the sensor valuespi has read and the actions it has taken. Interprocess communication is accomplished by the disciplined use of shared variables; a process can read and write its state variables, but can only read state variables maintained by other processes. For the moment, we will ignore the problems that arise from concurrent access to state variables.
Each process will consist of a single loop. During execution of its loop body, processpi (1) reads from some sensors, (2) That encoding will be denoted here by the function E. Therefore, at the beginning Code that satisfies this restriction can be written by using local variables to store state variables and sensor values: each state variable and sensor value is stored in a local variable when it is first read; subsequent references are then made to the local variable. 
. staten[i, t]).
Secondly, the values written to actuators by pi must be computed according to the application-specific function, here called A, based on the sensor values read and the past actions of processes. Therefore, after pi updates act~ for the tth time, [i, t], statel[i, t] .... , staten[i, t]) ). must be true.
Iact(i, t): t = 0 cor acti[t] = A(E(sensors
Let Ti be an auxiliary variable defined so that at any time Ti -1 executions of the loop body have completed. Thus, Ti is initialized to 1 and (implicitly and automatically} incremented immediately after the loop body is executed. Then, the correctness criterion PC is satisfied if
is true at the beginning of each execution of the loop body, for each process pi.
In order to construct the loop, variable newstate is introduced. This is necessary so that values used to update state~ and the actuators are consistent with each other. Thus
The loop at process p~, which has as I(i) as its loop invariant is However, because processes execute asynchronously, access to state variables must be synchronized. Otherwise, a process might read state variables while they are in the midst of being updated, which could cause the process to perform the wrong actions. To avoid this problem, the state variables maintained by each process p~ are assumed to be characterized by CCi, called the consistency constraint for statei. CC~ is kept true of state~ except while p~ is updating those variables, that is, performing up__st above. We assume that the code to compute the application dependent functions A and E works correctly as long as values that satisfy the consistency constraints are read. To ensure that only values satisfying the consistency constraints are read, read/write locks [5] can be used to implement reader-writer exclusion on the state variables maintained by each process. A process trying to read variables in statei must first acquire a read lock for state~. Such a lock will not be granted if a write lock is already held for those state variables; hence that process will be delayed if statei is being updated. A We use the notation "A cor B" to mean "ifA then true else B". process about to update statei will be delayed if other processes are reading those values. Such lock operations are not explicitly included in our programs to simplify the exposition; they are part of the routine to compute E in calc and up__st, the routine to update the state variables.
ACM
Similarly, we assume that the code to compute A and E requires that the sensor values used be consistent. The natural laws that govern our physical world ensure that at any time t the values of the sensors are consistent. Thus, if a process reads all the sensors simultaneously, consistent values would be obtained. Such a simultaneous read operation is not implementable, however. We therefore assume that sensors change values slowly enough and that processes execute quickly enough so that a consistent set of values is obtained by reading each of the sensors in sequence at normal execution speed.
Allowing Failures
We shall deal with failures by attempting to mask their effects. Thus we endeavor to preserve PC': At no time do state variables or actuators have values they could not have had if the failure had not occurred.
Recall that I(i) characterizes values of the state variables and actuators that satisfy PC. Consequently, if it is possible to modify the loop body so that I(i) is true of every state that could be visible after a failure, then PC' will be satisfied, as well. Our task, therefore, is to modify the loop body so that it constitutes a restartable action.
I(i) is true except from when the execution of statement up__act begins to when statement up__st completes. Thus, we must either mask intermediate states during execution of up__st and up__act, or devise a way to execute up__st and up__act together as an atomic action. This latter option is precluded by most hardware. Thus, to implement the former, we construct a single fault-tolerant action that updates the actuators and state variables on the basis of newstate:
As long as newstate is saved in stable storage, the following replete proof outline satisfies F1-F6 and accomplishes the desired transformation. Notice that following a failure, a process might attempt to acquire a given read/write lock that had already been granted to it. For example, if a failure occurred while up__st was being executed, the recovery protocol would attempt to acquire the write lock on statei, which might already be owned by pi. Clearly, repeated requests by a given process for the same lock, without intervening release operations, should not delay the invoker. Implementation of read/write locks with this property (binary semaphores do not suffice) is possible and is described in [20] .
DISCUSSION
Related Work
Few general techniques have been developed to aid in the design of programs that must cope with operational failures in hardware or support software. One paradigm, based on the use of state machines, was pioneered by Lamport [12, 22] . A program is viewed as a state machine that receives input, generates actions (output), and has an internal state. A reliable system is constructed by replicating these state machines and running them in parallel. By using a solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem, each machine is guaranteed to receive the same input, despite failures. A comparison of the state machine approach with the use of fail-stop processors and fault-tolerant actions appears in [23] . A second general paradigm, which appears to be promising, is based on the use of nested atomic transactions [14] .
A variety of protocols for specialized problems have also been developed. Included are protocols for recovery in database systems [5] , implementation of highly reliable file systems [15] , and the use of checkpoint/restart facilities in operating systems [3] .
Despite the apparent similarity between the recovery block construct developed at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne [19] and our fault-tolerant actions, the two constructs are intended for very different purposes. A recovery block consists of a primary block, an acceptance test, and one or more alternate blocks. Upon entry to a recovery block, the primary block is executed. After its completion, the acceptance test is executed to determine if the primary block has performed acceptably. If the test is passed, the recovery block terminates. Otherwise, an alternate block--generally a different implementation of the same algorithm--is attempted, and the acceptance test is repeated. Execution of each alternate block is attempted in sequence until one produces a state in which the acceptance test succeeds. Execution of an alternate block is always begun in the recovery block's initial state.
Recovery blocks are used to mask design errors; fault-tolerant actions are used in constructing programs that must cope with operational failures in the underlying hardware and software. The use of recovery blocks to cope with operational failures under such circumstances can only lead to difficulties. For example, a recovery block has only a finite number of alternate blocks associated with it, and therefore a large number of failures in the underlying system can cause the available alternatives to be exhausted. Secondly, the recovery block model does not admit the possibility of using stable storage for program variables.
Whence Fail-Stop Processors
The definition of the fail-stop processor as our underlying computational model followed from our use of a partial correctness programming logic. In a fail-stop processor all failures are detected and no incorrect state transformations result from failures. Thus, if execution of a statement terminates, by definition the transformation specified by that statement has occurred--the effect of execution is consistent with the programming logic. On the other hand, failure, by definition, prevents statements from terminating. Thus, the partial correctness (as opposed to total correctness) nature of the programming logic subsumes the consequences of failures.
Application of the Methodology
We have successfully employed the methodology described in this paper both to verify existing fault-tolerant protocols and to devise new ones. In [20] , the twophase commit protocol, as described in [5] , is verified. The process-control example described in Section 5 of this paper was developed as part of a project to apply this methodology in the design of a distributed computing system for navigation in an airplane. The details of that work are discussed in [24] .
It is natural to ask whether F1-F6, the components of our proof rule for faulttolerant actions, are too restrictive. In that case there would exist fault-tolerant actions that would behave correctly, but for which no proof would be possible. While we have not proved the relative completeness of our new rule, the success we have had with its application and the way in which it was derived suggest that F1-F6 are not too restrictive to allow proof of any "correct" fault-tolerant action.
CONCLUSIONS
We have described a methodology for constructing fault-tolerant systems. It is based on the notion of a fail-stop processor--a processor with simple and welldefined failure-mode operating characteristics. Fail-stop processors are very appealing abstract machines to program and can be approximated by real hardware.
We have shown how axiomatic program verification techniques can be extended for proving the correctness of programs written for fail-stop processors. This allows a programmer to argue convincingly about the correctness of a program ex post facto. What is more important is that it allows a programmer to develop a fault-tolerant program and its proof hand-in-hand, with the latter leading the way, as advocated in [4] and [6] . 
